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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ANA LILIA GONZALEZ,

Case No. 900552-CA

Priority No. 2
Appellant/Petitioner.

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Petitioner Gonzalez files this petition for rehearing.
In Cumminas v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912), the Utah
Supreme Court noted the appropriate standard for filing a petition:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions for
rehearings in proper cases. When this court,
however, has considered and decided all of the
material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we
have based the decision on some wrong principle
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result
. . . If there are some reasons, however, such
as we have indicated above, or other good
reasons, a petition for a rehearing should be
promptly filed and, if it is meritorious, its
form will in no case be scrutinized by this court.
129 P. at 624. This petition for rehearing meets the preceding
standards in both form and substance and should be granted for the
reasons discussed below.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 18, 1991, this Court affirmed Petitioner
Gonzalez's conviction for forgery, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990).

The Court of Appeals

decision is attached as Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner Gonzalez agrees with the facts set forth in the
opinion.

See State v. Gonzalez, Case No. 900552-CA at pages 1-2

(Utah App. October 18, 1991)(Addendum A ) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Gonzalez opinion's standard of review for the
admissibility of evidence contrasts with the governing standard
cited by the Utah Supreme Court, see State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv.
Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah 1991), and with prior decisions announced by
the Court of Appeals.

See, e.g.. State v. Taylor, 169 Utah Adv.

Rep. 62, 65 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Reed. Case No. 900405, page 2
(Utah App. October 23, 1991).

In an effort to maintain consistency

for future reference and analysis, petitioner respectfully requests
this Court to amend the Gonzalez opinion in a manner consistent with
existing caselaw.
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ARGUMENT
POINT
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE IS PURSUANT TO A "CORRECTNESS" STANDARD
In State v. Gonzalez. Case No. 900552-CA (Utah App. October
18, 1991), this Court stated:

"We will not disturb a trial court

ruling on admissibility of evidence 'in the absence of a clear abuse
of discretion.'"

Id. at page 4 (citing State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d

879, 883 (Utah 1988)).

During oral argument, however, Petitioner

Gonzalez cited a recent Utah Supreme Court decision, State v.
Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (Utah 1991), which clarified
and updated the appropriate standard of review.

The Ramirez

decision explained that in past decisions, the "'abuse of
discretion' terminology [was] used inappropriately.

Whether a piece

of evidence is admissible is a question of law, and we always review
questions of law under a correctness standard."

Ramirez, 159 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 16 n.3.
This very panel, in decisions both before and after
Gonzalez, cited the Ramirez standard with approval for the
admissibility of evidence.

See, e.g.. State v. Taylor. 169 Utah

Adv. Rep. 62, 65 (Utah App. 1991) (Billings, J., joined by Orme and
Russon, J.J.) (the Taylor decision was filed on September 12, 1991,
just 36 days before Gonzalez); State v. Reed. Case No. 900405-CA at
page 2 (Utah App. October 23, 1991) (Russon, J., joined by Billings
and Orme, J.J.) (the Reed decision, filed a mere five days after
Gonzalez, cited Ramirez for the following standard:
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"Whether

testimony is admissible is a question of law, which we review under
a correctness standard, incorporating a 'clearly erroneous' standard
for the review of subsidiary factual determinations").
The Gonzalez opinion improperly analyzed the admissibility
of two pieces of evidence under the "abuse of discretion" standard.
It "conclude[d] that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
prohibiting the said testimony [of an individual who overheard
Shannon O'Neill boast about her access to her sister's checkbook]."
State v. Gonzalez. Case No. 900552-CA, page 4 (Utah App. October 18,
1991).

The opinion also gave "due deference to the trial court [in

holding] that the admission of the entire checkbook did not
constitute an abuse of discretion."

Id. at page 5.

While a different analysis under the Ramirez standard of
review may nonetheless produce the same result, for purposes of
consistency Petitioner requests this Court to amend the language and
analysis used in the Gonzalez opinion.

CONCLUSION
Petitioner Gonzalez respectfully requests a rehearing by
this Court on the matter discussed herein.
SUBMITTED this

f

day of November, 1991.

RONALD S. FUJINO
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner
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CERTIFICATION
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this

(2)

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court

case;

in good faith and not to unnecessarily delay disposition of this
matter.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/

day of November, 1991.

fcONALDS.
S. FUJINO
FUJ
RONALD
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that eight copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and
four copies to Kenneth A. Bronston, the Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

I

day of

November, 1991.

&

RONALD S. FUJINO

DELIVERED by
of November, 1991.

this

day

ADDENDUM A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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OPINION
(For Publication)

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 900552-CA
Ana Lilia Gonzalez,
FILED
(October 18, 1991)

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Lisa J. Remal and Ronald S. Fujino, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon.
RUSSON, Judge:
Ana Lilia Gonzalez appeals her conviction of forgery, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501
(1990). We affirm.
FACTS
On January 21, 1991, Gonzalez went to a Smith's Food and
Drug Center in Salt Lake City with four other people. Although
Gonzalez did not select anything for herself, the group filled a
shopping cart with make-up, body building vitamins, and other
expensive items totaling $268.28. Gonzalez wrote and presented a
check for $300, writing in the amount, "Smith's" as the payee,
and the signature of Christie Cotner, the name on the check.
Gonzalez also presented a Smith's check-cashing card and a VISA
check guarantee card, both bearing Cotner's name. Because of the
large amount of the check and the nature of the items, the
assistant manager was called to verify the check. He called the
phone number listed on the check, and reaching Cotner's

residence, was told that the checkbook had been stolen the day
before when Cotner was shopping in West Valley City. The
assistant manager called the police, and upon arrival, an officer
interviewed and arrested Gonzalez, charging her with forgery, a
second degree felony.
At trial, Gonzalez testified as follows: At a party on
January 20, she heard Shannon (or Sherry) O'Neill boast that her
sister allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a loan-type basis.
At that party, Gonzalez loaned O'Neill "a couple of bucks" with
the intention of returning the next day for the money. The next
day O'Neill, who did not have enough cash to repay Gonzalez,
asked Gonzalez to buy her some groceries and write the check to
cover the cost of the groceries, plus the amount owed.
Gonzalez
thought nothing of using another's checkbook because she had,
with permission, used her mother's in the past. In addition to
Cotner's checkbook, O'Neill gave Cotner's VISA check guarantee
card and Smith's check-cashing card to Gonzalez. Gonzalez then
went with four of O'Neill's friends to Smith's.
Additionally at trial, the court received, over Gonzalez's
objection, the entire checkbook offered by the State as evidence
of Gonzalez's culpable state of mind. The trial court also
sustained the State's objection to testimony offered to
corroborate Gonzalez's testimony as to O'Neill's statement about
purporting to have her sister's authority to use the checkbook.
Gonzalez was subsequently tried and convicted of forgery.
ISSUES
Gonzalez appeals that conviction, raising the following
issues: (1) Was the evidence at trial sufficient to show that
she acted with purpose to defraud? (2) Did the trial court abuse
its discretion in prohibiting testimony corroborative of her
testimony of her lack of intent to defraud? (3) Did the trial
court abuse its discretion in admitting the entire checkbook from
which she wrote the check? (4) Did the trial court err in
.refusing her proposed jury instruction on reasonable doubt?
I.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Gonzalez first asserts that the State did not present
sufficient evidence to convict her of forgery because it failed
to prove her purpose to defraud. We review the evidence in a
light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Johnson.
784 P.2d 1135, 1138 (Utah 1989). We reverse a conviction only
when "the evidence and its inferences are so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
900552-CA
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which [she] was convicted. •• State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738
(Utah App. 1989) (quotation omitted).
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501 (1990) reads, in pertinent part:
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if,
with purpose to defraud anyone, or. with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to
be perpetrated by anyone, he:

(b) Makes, completes,.executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any
writing so that the writing or
the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act
of another . . . .
In accordance with the said statute, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that in order to prove forgery, "the state must show
that the defendant not only used the name of another, but must
also show that [she] did so without any authority to do so."
State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317, 1317 (Utah 1979).
Utah courts have yet to define the term "purpose to
defraud," but the Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "'intent to
defraud' . . . is simply a purpose to use a false writing as if
it were genuine in order to gain some advantage[.]" State v.
May, 93 Idaho 343, 461 P.2d 126, 128 (1969) (citations omitted).
That court went on to state that "a false writing has such an
obvious tendency to accomplish fraud that the jury is warranted
in inferring such an intent from the mere creation of an
instrument that is false." !£. (citation omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence was not so inconclusive that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt as to Gonzalez's guilt.
Indeed, Gonzalez's actions meet all of the requirements of
forgery. By filling in the check, signing Cotner's name, and
presenting Cotner's VISA check guarantee and Smith's checkcashing cards, Gonzalez completed the writing of the check while
purporting to be Cotner. Gonzalez did this without any authority
from Cotner. It does not matter that Gonzalez thought that she
had authority from O'Neill. It is well established that one
needs the authority of the person whose name is signed. See
State v. Jones. 81 Utah 503, 20 P.2d 614, 617 (1933). It
follows, therefore, that O'Neill could not confer valid authority
to Gonzalez to sign Cotner's name.
900552-CA
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Moreover, we hold that the act of completing the check
implies a purpose to defraud. See May, 461 P.2d at 128.
Gonzalez proffered the check to Smiths as if it were genuine and
would have gained the extra cash beyond the purchase price if she
had not been apprehended. Furthermore, the others shopping with
Gonzalez would have gained the advantage of the purchase as a
result of Gonzalez's act. Accordingly# we find there was
sufficient evidence to find Gonzalez guilty of forgery.
II.

EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY

Gonzalez next contends that the trial court erred by
prohibiting testimony corroborative of her own testimony of her
lack of intent to defraud. Specifically, Gonzalez sought to
present testimony that another person heard 0/Neill boast that
her sister allowed O'Neill to use her checkbook on a loan-type
basis. We will not disturb a trial court ruling on admissibility
of evidence "in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.11
State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (citation
omitted) . ,fTo constitute an abuse of discretion, the error must
have been harmful." State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 419 (Utah
1989) (citations omitted).
In support of her argument that such testimony should have
been admitted, Gonzalez relies on a case from the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit which approved the admission of
hearsay evidence to establish a defendant's reliance on the
advice of counsel. United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540
(11th Cir. 1984). In Eisenstein, the trial court excluded the
testimony of the defendants' attorney, offered to prove that the
defendants had given full disclosure to the attorney and relied
on the subsequent advice. The court of appeals reversed,
narrowly holding that such exclusion was improper because "it was
necessarily relevant for the lawyer to tell the jury the nature
of the enterprise presented to him by [defendants] and upon which
he gave his advice." Ic[. at 1546 (emphasis in original).
Here, the evidence which Gonzalez sought to present is
wholly irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Thus,.
Eisenstein is inapplicable to the case at bar. The sole purpose
of the excluded testimony was that another person who attended
the party had heard O'Neill's statement about her own use of the
checkbook. Since O'Neill could not confer valid authority to
Gonzalez to sign Cotner's name, the excluded testimony had no
probative value as to Gonzalez's authority to use Cotner's
checkbook. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in prohibiting the said testimony.

900552-CA
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III. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
Over Gonzalez's objection, the trial court admitted the
entire checkbook from which Gonzalez wrote the check in question.
Gonzalez argues that the checkbook is irrelevant, and thus, this
admission was reversible error, under Utah Rule of Evidence 402,
which states that "evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible at trial." Again, we review the trial court's ruling
as to admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v, Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988).
This court has previously held that lf%where evidence [is]
shown to have supported only conjectural inferences which had
little probative value' . . . reversal may be appropriate on
*grounds that the improperly admitted evidence could only have
served to confuse and mislead the jury or prejudice the outcome
of the case./lf State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah App.
1987) (quoting Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491-92 (Utah
1985)). Gonzalez contends that because she was not charged with
any offense other than forgery of the single check, the rest of
the checkbook has no probative value and only served to confuse
and mislead the jury. We disagree.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "if the evidence has
relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant
crime, it is admissible for that purpose." State v, Daniels, 584
P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1978). The court has also held that intent
"may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from
surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphv, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223
(Utah 1983) (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, Gonzalez's claim that admission of the
checkbook only served to mislead or confuse the jury is
insupportable because the prosecution made it clear in closing
argument that Gonzalez was only being charged with the one act of
forgery. Secondly, the checkbook is relevant to the single count
of forgery as indirect evidence explaining the circumstances
surrounding the crime. Thirdly, it is probative of Gonzalez's
intent to defraud. Therefore, giving due deference to the trial
court, we hold that "the admission of the entire checkbook did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
IV. REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
Lastly, Gonzalez claims that the trial court erred by
refusing her proposed jury instruction on reasonable doubt. "An
appeal challenging the refusal to give a jury instruction
presents a question of law only. Therefore, . . . [we show] no
particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v.
Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815
P.2d 241 (1991).
900552-CA
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This court has recently considered the very instruction
given by the trial courtr and determined that it was an
appropriate definition of reasonable doubt. See Pedersen. 802
P.2d at 1331-32. Gonzalez, however, argues that the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Cage v. Louisiana. 498
U.S.
, 111 S. ct. 328 (1990) (per curiam) invalidates our
prior ruling because of the similarities in the two instructions
in question. We disagree.
In Cage, the Court acknowledged that the "reasonable doubt
standard #plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure.' Among other things, 'it is a prime instrument for
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.'11 Id.
at
, 111 S. Ct. at 329 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
363f 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970)). Accordingly, the Supreme
Court reasoned that in "construing the [reasonable doubt]
instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors could have
understood the charge as a whole." Id. at
, ill s. Ct. at 329
(citing Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 316, 105 S. Ct. 1965,
1972 (1985)).
Comparing Cage to the present case, we determine that the
instruction in question is sufficiently different from the one
rejected in Cage, and therefore it remains an adequate definition
of reasonable doubt. In Cage, the Supreme Court questioned the
phrases "substantial doubt," "grave uncertainty," and "moral
certainty" contained in the reasonable doubt instruction. The
Court ruled that these phrases could allow "a reasonable juror
[to interpret] the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based
on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process
Clause." Id. at
, 111 S. Ct. at 330. The instruction in the
case at bar has no such language. Any similarities1 between the
two instructions were not questioned by the Supreme Court. Thus,
Cage has no applicability to the instruction in Pedersen. nor to
the instruction given here. Therefore, we "need not consider
whether [Gonzalez's] proposed instruction might also have been
proper or even preferable." Pedersenf 802 P.2d at 1331-32.

1. Gonzalez argues that the Cage instruction and the Pedersen
instruction are similar because both have a presumption of
innocence clause, both mandate acquittal if the State fails to
meet its burden of proof, both require doubt to be reasonable,
and neither requires proof to an absolute certainty. However,
these similarities are not questioned by the Supreme Court, and
are wholly appropriate for a reasonable doubt instruction. See
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32.
900552-CA
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the evidence at trial was
sufficient to show that Gonzalez acted with purpose to defraud;
(2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting
testimony corroborative of Gonzalez's testimony of her lack of
intent to defraud, nor in admitting the entire checkbook from
which Gonzalez wrote the check; and (3) the trial court properly
refused Gonzalez's jury instruction on reasonable doubt.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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